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VICTOR TADROS Distributing Responsibility
A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in
public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair alloca-
tion or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently
of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for
wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of
requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for
the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than
another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of
inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her
responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on.
Little attention has been paid to the central issue of this article: the alloca-
tion and distribution of responsibility itself. How can responsibility be allo-
cated or distributed? The social structures of a society, and the choices that
individuals make within them, make a difference to who will be responsible
for what and how responsible they will be. A person’s responsibility for
wrongful actions, imprudent actions, prudent actions, good actions, super-
erogatory actions, and so on, is itself influenced by social structures and
choices. Given their impact on what people will be responsible for, how
should these social structures be developed, and choices be made?
The allocation and distribution of responsibility can be fair or unfair:
responsibility for conduct itself, I argue, makes decisions just or unjust,
and that affects the just distribution of other things, such as welfare-
generating resources. Furthermore, the potential injustice of inequalities in
responsibility can be counterbalanced by reverse inequalities in welfare-
generating resources. This second idea has radical implications for the
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relationship between welfare or resources on the one hand and responsi-
bility on the other—in distributive justice, there is at least some pressure
to allocate welfare or resources to those who are responsible for wrongdo-
ing, and away from those who are responsible for good deeds.
I. What Is responsibility?
Grasping the idea that responsibility can be allocated or distributed
involves understanding responsibility. I am concerned with one sense of
responsibility—the sense involved in attributing actions to people. This
sense of responsibility is invoked in propositions like: Mark Chapman was
responsible for killing John Lennon; Jane Austen was responsible for writ-
ing Pride and Prejudice; Marie Curie was responsible for discovering the
theory of radioactivity; and so on.
I don’t have space for a detailed defense of any particular view of
responsibility. However, I will make some assumptions about it. I assume
compatibilism: that responsibility is compatible with determinism. I also
assume that people are responsible for their conduct in the wide range of
circumstances that roughly corresponds to the folk view. Absent exemp-
tions or excuses, people are normally responsible for what they do inten-
tionally, voluntarily, recklessly, negligently, and so on.
One reason for these assumptions is that I have compatibilist sympa-
thies, as do most people who write about responsibility, including those
who are concerned with the role of responsibility in matters of justice.
And most compatibilists, including me, don’t have extremely revisionist
views about who is responsible for what in the real world. Furthermore,
compatibilism helps us to brightly illuminate the distributive problems
that I will raise. In Section IX, I briefly explore the question I am con-
cerned with for libertarians.
Here is a more precise and complete statement of my assumptions. A
person is responsible for her conduct because her acts are caused by cer-
tain agential facts—what I will just call “the relevant agential facts.” Com-
patibilists disagree about these facts. Some think that people are
responsible for acts because they issue from the correspondence of first-
and second-order preferences or desires; others because their acts issue
from what they value, or from their character; others because they were
able to do otherwise (in some sense compatible with determinism); and
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others because their actions were governed by suitably reason-responsive
mechanisms. I remain neutral on that issue.
I also assume that some standard responses to a person because she
was responsible for her conduct are apt, though not that any particular
response is warranted. The range of responses include certain conversa-
tional practices about a person’s wrongdoing, certain emotional responses
to the person such as resentment, anger, indignation, sadness, and some
kinds of blame. I assume a similar thing about responsibility for inten-
tional good acts—that gratitude and praise, for example, are apt because
the person was responsible for her good acts.1
I do not assume any normative or axiological relationship between wel-
fare and responsibility: that it is better, or more just, that those who are
responsible for wrongdoing are (or are made) worse off, or that those who
are responsible for good deeds are (or are made) better off. One of my
aims is to explore those issues.2
Finally, I assume that this fairly standard understanding of determinism
is true:
Determinism: Determinism is true in some world if the complete state
of that world at any time, t1, and the physical laws that apply to it,
makes the complete state of that world at all later times inevitable.
As how a person acts is part of the complete state of the world at the
time at which they act, compatibilism is thus understood as the view that
a person can be responsible for what she has done even though it was
1. Though the article is cryptic, Peter F. Strawson’s essay, “Freedom and Resentment,” in
Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), did a great deal to
stimulate interest in this idea. Prominent defenders of this approach include Gary Watson,
Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: OUP, 2004); Thomas M. Scanlon, What We
Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1998), chap. 6; Thomas M. Scanlon,
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2008),
chap. 4. Even some who are skeptical that we can deserve blame, because we lack the free
will needed, think that some practices like these can be apt. See, for example, Derk
Pereboom, “A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune from the Threat from Causal
Determination,” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, eds. R. Clarke,
M. McKenna, and A. M. Smith (Oxford: OUP, 2015).
2. Some think that there is a sense or kind of responsibility that involves a person deserv-
ing to be better or worse off as a result of the relevant agential facts. I doubt that this is right.
For discussion, see Victor Tadros, “Responsibility as Personal Significance” (unpublished
manuscript). If I am wrong, I do not assume that we have this kind of responsibility.
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inevitable that she acted as she did given the state of the world prior to
her birth, and the physical laws that apply to it.
II. The Social Dependence of Responsibility in the Real World
If these assumptions are true, responsibility is obviously socially depen-
dent. Indeed, it is socially dependent on any plausible view of responsibil-
ity that is not radically revisionist. How many people are responsible for
wrongdoing, and who these people are, depends on geography, architec-
ture, resource distribution, parenting, education, employment opportuni-
ties, and so on. These things either involve social and political decisions,
or their allocation and distribution stem from social and political
decisions.
For example, the rate of violent wrongdoing is much higher in poor
urban communities than in wealthy rural villages. Social and political
decisions determine how many people grow up in which communities
and what they are like. A different set of decisions by politicians, urban
planners, and voters would have exacerbated or ameliorated criminogenic
differences in social circumstances that people grow up in, resulting in dif-
ferent rates and distributions of wrongdoing. Only radical skeptics about
responsibility conclude that the social determinants of wrongdoing under-
mine responsibility completely, so these social and political decisions, in
conjunction with other facts, determine the rate and distribution of
responsibility for wrongdoing.
Cases of large-scale social planning involve tricky nonidentity issues—
which people exist, and then act wrongly, depends on large-scale social
and political decisions about wealth, geography, and architecture. I limit
my focus to cases where identity is fixed. Social and political decisions
obviously affect who is responsible for wrongdoing in such cases too. Here
is a striking example. As Elizabeth Hinton shows, two distinct approaches
were used to deal with young offenders in the United States in the 1970s.3
A more rehabilitative approach tended to be used for white young
offenders, while a more punitive approach tended to be used for blacks.
There is significant evidence that the more rehabilitative approach
resulted in less recidivism and escalation of criminal activity, partly
3. See Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of
Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2016), chap. 6.
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because the punitive approach involved incarceration, which created com-
munities of offenders. This may well have resulted in black young
offenders in the 1970s committing more crimes than white young
offenders later in life.
Again, only a radical skeptic about responsibility concludes that these
black people are not responsible for their wrongful conduct later in life
because of the decision to incarcerate them rather than rehabilitate them
when they were young. Yet the racist decisions to incarcerate blacks rather
than whites were obviously unjust. Part of the injustice is that incarcera-
tion increased the chance that these people would act wrongly later in life.
As young black offenders had a powerful interest in not acting wrongly
later in life, they had an interest in being rehabilitated rather than incar-
cerated and that made the decisions unjust. Or so I will argue.
Similar examples are widespread and familiar. Social policies are often
designed to prevent wrongdoing or are criticized for failing to do
so. Erosion of educational and social facilities for young people are criti-
cized because they make a difference to whether young people offend;
transitional processes, practices, and institutions for military personnel, as
well as those who have been incarcerated, are needed in part because
these people are especially likely to offend or reoffend; urban environ-
ments and school buildings need to be restored and protected, because
erosion of those environments causes crime; and so on. The interests of
potential victims of wrongdoing are relevant to these decisions, but so are
the interests of potential wrongdoers in being guided away from
wrongdoing.
Social policies also aim to ensure that people act well. Education and
parenting can foster a sense of justice and are criticized if they fail to do
so. Noble deeds and valuable discoveries are celebrated to inspire people
to emulate and go beyond the achievements of others. The distribution of
educational resources, support to parents, and accolades determines the
rate of valuable acts, and who will perform them. But people are neverthe-
less responsible for the good deeds that result from these social policies.
Policies, practices, and decisions that determine the rate and distribu-
tion of responsibility create conflicts of interest, because they require
resources. Where those resources are scarce, decisions must be taken
about their distribution. How much should be spent on preventing wrong-
ful conduct, and how much on supporting good conduct? And what prin-
ciples make the distribution of resources to bring about responsibility for
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good and bad acts just? These questions have received little attention in
debates about distributive justice. And these familiar social questions are
themselves particular instances of a much more general problem: given
that responsibility for good and bad acts is itself caused by social and
political decisions, how should responsibility be distributed, and how does
its distribution interact with the distribution of other things that are a mat-
ter of justice?
III. The Value and Disvalue of Responsibility
The examples just outlined have many distracting features that make
it harder to focus on the distribution of responsibility as such. The
decision to incarcerate young black people rather than whites, for
example, is unjust independently of its effects on responsibility for
wrongdoing.
In what follows I reflect on cleaner cases to show four things. First, in
this section, I show that it is disvaluable for a person to be responsible for
wrongdoing both for instrumental reasons and as such. This helps to estab-
lish that responsibility is part of the currency of justice, because justice is
mainly concerned with the allocation or distribution of things that matter
independently of justice. Second, in Section IV, I show that familiar issues
in distributive justice apply to responsibility itself. Third, in Section V, I
show that what is just overall depends on intrapersonal and interpersonal
tradeoffs between different interests relevant to justice. And that supports
my fourth conclusion: the initially strongly counterintuitive view that there
are reasons of distributive justice to provide more welfare-generating
resources to those who are responsible for wrongdoing than those who are
not other things equal. I then explore the relationship between distributive
justice and other normative considerations to indicate the complexity of
the relationship between the distributive considerations considered here
and other features of justice. The argument in Section VI suggests that sim-
ilar conclusions to those defended on compatiblist assumptions are true if
incompatibilism about responsibility is true.
A. Cleaning Up
I begin with a case that focuses our attention on the allocation of
responsibility for wrongdoing, where who is responsible for wrongdoing
depends on a social decision taken before a person was responsible,
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and there is no reason to care about the decision independently of
that fact:
Seating Arrangement: Billy and Bobby start a new school at age 7, and
are very similar. On their first day, Teacher sits them in two free seats
in class. In World 1, where Teacher sits Billy next to Jack, Jack becomes
Billy’s best friend. In a nearby world, World 2, Teacher sits Billy next to
John and John becomes Billy’s best friend. Things are vice versa for
Bobby. In World 1, Jack is a bad influence on Billy. When they are
20, he persuades Billy to commit a single crime—a serious assault on
Jeff—which Billy does intentionally and without excuse. This does not
happen in World 2: Billy does not commit any serious wrongs in that
world, as John is a good influence on Billy. Again, things are vice versa
for Bobby. Other things are equal.
Recall that we are assuming Determinism. Let us also assume that the
difference between World 1 and World 2 at the time that Billy and Bobby
are seated just arises from the decision that Teacher makes. Future differ-
ences between these worlds depend on Teacher’s decision. The world
where Teacher decides to sit Billy next to Jack is World 1. It is inevitable in
that world, at the moment that he is seated, that Billy will assault Jeff, and
Bobby will not. But, obviously, Billy is not responsible, at the moment that
he sits next to Jack, for anything that he does in the future. He is not mor-
ally responsible for anything at the age of 7. The world where Teacher
decides to sit Billy next to John is World 2. It is inevitable in that world, at
the moment that he is seated, that Bobby will assault Jeff, and Billy
will not.
Suppose further that the difference between World 1 and World 2 is the
most minimal thing that gives rise to Teacher making the different deci-
sions that she makes in World 1 and World 2 (say, for example, that her
head is slightly turned to Billy when the boys enter the classroom in World
1 where it is slightly turned to Bobby in World 2). That thing has no moral
salience beyond its effect on her decision.
Given the assumptions outlined in Section I, although Billy’s assault on
Jeff counterfactually depends on Teacher’s decision, and Billy is not
responsible for that, he is responsible for assaulting Jeff. All compatibilists
should be comfortable with this conclusion; the case is much less
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controversial than cases that have been used to challenge compatibilism,
such as manipulation cases.4
Unlike most real-world cases, there are no victim-centered reasons that
affect the value of who sits where—Jeff will suffer the same fate whoever
sits next to Jack. This helps to focus our attention on the interests of Billy
and Bobby in responsibility without being distracted by the difference that
responsibility for wrongdoing makes for others.
B. Responsibility for Wrongdoing Is Worse for Us
In this subsection, I show that World 1 is less valuable for Billy than World
2. I make no claims about well-being in particular. There is a great deal of
dispute about what well-being includes. On some views, responsibility for
wrongdoing is a negative component of well-being. I do not defend this
idea: only the idea that responsibility for wrongdoing matters for the sake
of the responsible person.
Here are three reasons why his responsibility for wrongdoing matters
for the sake of Billy, and thus that he has reason to value World 2 over
World 1. The first is instrumental. People inflict harms and other costs on
wrongdoers. They are subject to defensive, punitive, and compensatory
harm, for example, and they are publicly criticized, shunned, and socially
ostracized. Some of these responses may be warranted; others are not. But
warranted or not, people have good reason to disvalue being responsible
for wrongdoing because of these effects. These effects do not establish that
responsibility fundamentally matters for distributive justice—only that it
typically affects other things that fundamentally matter.
Second, it matters for the sake of a person that certain responses to
them are (or are not) apt. For example, a person has reason to disvalue it
being apt to blame her for her conduct, for others to resent her, and for
4. Perhaps the most influential challenge of this kind is Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency,
and Meaning in Life (Oxford: OUP, 2014), chap. 4. Our intuitions about manipulation cases
are less reliable, both because we find manipulation morally significant and because our
intuitions are partly explained by the impression that the cases create that there is a differ-
ence in responsibility between the manipulators and those who are manipulated. Even with
respect to those cases, many people continue to think that responsibility is not threatened.
Furthermore, even those who think that it is focus on a narrow conception of responsibility—
that concerned with basic desert. For further discussion, see, for example, Michael McKenna,
“A Hard Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 77 (2008): 142; Carolina Sartorio, Causation and Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Vic-
tor Tadros Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford: OUP, 2016) chap. 5.
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her to feel guilty at what she has done, independently of whether anyone
has these reactions. People often want to do things that are worthy of
respect, and not worthy of contempt, not just because of the things that
make these reactions apt, but because of the aptness of these reactions
themselves. For example, a child might be motivated not to act in a way
that would disappoint his parents, or to act in a way that they would
approve of, even after his parents have died. But these motivations are
warranted only if their reactions to his conduct would be apt.
Third, and most importantly for our purposes, it is disvaluable for a
person’s sake that she is responsible for wrongdoing as such, indepen-
dently of the actual or likely consequences of being responsible, or what it
makes apt. To see this, suppose that you are Billy’s parent. Parents have
stronger reason to hope that the world is valuable for their children than
they have to hope that it is valuable for strangers, and typically do so. You
have good reason to hope that Billy rather than Bobby will not be respon-
sible for wrongdoing, quite independently of any further bad conse-
quences that this will have for Billy, or the reactions that others would be
justified in having to his conduct. For this reason, you hope, for Billy’s
sake, that you live in World 2, where Teacher sits Billy next to John.
To fully grasp the fact that responsibility for wrongdoing is significant
in itself, it helps to consider a case where the negative consequences of a
person being responsible for wrongdoing don’t occur, such as:
Amnesia: As Seating Arrangement, except that everyone in World
1, including Billy and Bobby, thinks that Bobby has assaulted Jeff. This
is because Billy and Bobby were drunk on the night in question; drunk
enough that they cannot remember what happened, but not so drunk
that they lacked responsibility for what they did. Furthermore, it
appears to Jeff that Bobby rather than Billy assaults him, which he then
reports. And the incident is caught on camera in a way that makes the
culprit look more like Bobby than Billy, so there is good evidence that
Bobby was the wrongdoer. All of the bad effects that anyone gets from
the judgment that a person is responsible for the assault, such as the
bad feelings, the punishment, and the legal obligation pay compensa-
tion, thus fall on Bobby. The feelings of guilt are not very severe, and
the burdens that he suffers through punishment and compensation are
not awful. In World 2, things are vice versa between Bobby and Billy.
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Which world is more valuable for Billy? To test this, imagine again that
you are Billy’s parent. I take it that parents have powerful reasons to hope
that their children will not be wrongly accused, convicted, and punished
for wrongdoing. Not only is Billy worse off in these respects in World 2, he
unjustly worse off. So, there are powerful reasons for Billy’s parents to
favor World 1, where Billy was responsible for wrongdoing, but is not
accused, convicted, and punished for it.
Nevertheless, overall, were I Billy’s parent, I would prefer World
2, where although Billy is accused, convicted, and punished for something
he didn’t do, he wasn’t responsible for wrongdoing. Having asked many
people this question, only a small minority prefer World 1 to World 2 for
Billy’s sake.5 Even those who conclude that Billy’s well-being is greater in
World 1 than World 2 tend to think that well-being is not all that matters,
and that responsibility for wrongdoing counterbalances differences in the
loss of well-being and the unjust treatment that Billy faces in World 2. Fur-
thermore, even those who think that World 1 is preferable for Billy’s sake
find the question difficult, which suggests that something powerful coun-
terbalances the bad effects of being wrongly accused of wrongdoing in
World 2.
Perhaps some may put this intuitive reaction down to the fact that a
parent fails in her parental responsibilities if her child is a wrongdoer. But
a similar thing is intuitive from the first-person perspective. Suppose that
you wake up from a coma, knowing that you have been involved in a seri-
ous assault, but not knowing whether you committed the assault of were
the victim of it. As long as the consequences are not awful, I would much
prefer to be the victim of the assault. The vast majority of those I have
asked share this view.
Some might argue that it is wrongdoing, rather than responsibility for
wrongdoing, that explains our reaction. To test for this, suppose that on
waking up from a coma, you know that you and one other person have
assaulted a person together. Only one of you was responsible because the
other was hypnotized. I hope that I was the one who was hypnotized and
this view is also widely shared.
5. At several points in the article, I will indicate that certain intuitions are widely shared
or supported. This is the impressionistic result of discussion with many people about the
cases in seminars, lectures, and more informally. This is admittedly unscientific!
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Perhaps it might be argued that these things are true because of the
ways in which it is apt to respond to those who are responsible for wrong-
doing. It is difficult to test for this, but when reflecting on Amnesia, it
doesn’t seem that the reason for our preferring World 2 for Billy’s sake is
mainly to do with the apt reaction to Billy’s conduct, rather than responsi-
bility for wrongdoing itself.
Just as responsibility for wrongdoing matters as such, so does responsi-
bility for good deeds. Consider:
Seating Arrangement (Good Variation): As Seating Arrangement but
Jack is a good influence, so that rather than assaulting Jeff, Billy but not
Bobby performs a supererogatory life-saving act in World 1, whereas
Bobby but not Billy does so in World 2.
Billy’s parents have reason to hope that Billy is in World 1. That is also
true in Amnesia (Good Variation) where if Billy performs the supereroga-
tory act, Bobby gets the credit. As before, these judgments are warranted
because responsibility for supererogatory acts matters as such and not just
because of the consequences, or what the considerations make apt. Fur-
thermore, as before, we can see that responsibility has value from the fact
that Billy has reason to hope that if he performs the supererogatory res-
cue, he does so voluntarily, and not, for example, from hypnosis.
Why do people have a reason to prefer that they are responsible for
good deeds, and not responsible for wrongdoing? This is a difficult ques-
tion, and nothing I say depends on any particular answer. But I can sketch
a suggestion. As well as their capacity for pleasure and pain, people have
distinctive and significant moral value and moral status because they are
able to critically reflect on values and reasons for action, and respond to
them appropriately. The exercise of these abilities is in keeping with what
makes the person have moral status when they are exercised well, and it
is in conflict with what makes the person have moral status when they are
exercised badly. Where a person acts wrongly, she either fails to critically
reflect on values and reasons for action appropriately, or she fails to
respond appropriately. And that gives her life less value because her con-
duct is in conflict with what gives her moral status. When a person acts
very well, the contrary is true.
When I say that the person’s life has less or more value, I don’t mean
that her life is less important from a moral point of view, or that people
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have less reason to care about what happens to her. As we shall see, there
is some sense in which the opposite is true. The importance of a person’s
life depends on her moral status, and not on what she does. I mean,
rather, that her life is less good, and she therefore has less reason to value
the fact that her life is lived in that way.
IV. From Value to Justice
Having established that being responsible for conduct is valuable for the
sake of the responsible person (in the case of supererogatory acts) or dis-
valuable for the sake of the responsible person (in the case of wrongful
acts) in itself, I turn from evaluative to normative questions. Because
responsibility has value or disvalue for a person, and responsibility coun-
terfactually depends on decisions of others, responsibility itself can be dis-
tributed justly or unjustly. The real-world examples offered in Section II
already suggest this. But the view can be more clearly and powerfully
exemplified and supported using hypothetical cases.
In the real world we are often uncertain whether our social decisions
will result in particular people being responsible for wrongdoing. For
example, those who incarcerated black people in the 1970s did not know
that any particular person would be responsible for wrongdoing as a result
of their decisions, even if they had evidence that a larger proportion of the
incarcerated population than the non-incarcerated population would be.
This can create the misleading impression that future wrongdoing was
the result of choices made by the incarcerated population rather than the
decision to incarcerate them. The temptation to see things this way arises
because we have the pre-theoretical intuition that if our conduct is cho-
sen, it is not fully determined by events prior to choice. But, assuming
compatibilism, the right way to understand these cases is as follows: some
people’s wrongdoing counterfactually depends on the decision to incar-
cerate them; that decision was a feature of the state of the world prior to
their wrongdoing that makes their wrongdoing inevitable; and yet that is
compatible with their choosing to act wrongly, and being responsible for
their wrongdoing.
To avoid the distracting incompatibilist temptations, let us consider
cases where it is clear that social decisions prior to a person being respon-
sible for anything make the difference between it being inevitable that she
is responsible for wrongdoing in the future and it being inevitable that she
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is not. And such cases have a further virtue. There are powerful arguments
that in a deterministic world there are no objective probabilities.6 And
even if there are, they make no difference to who is responsible for what.
Furthermore, after a person is responsible for wrongdoing, we can be vir-
tually certain that her responsibility counterfactually depended on, earlier
social decisions. We may be uncertain about which decisions made the
relevant difference (although we are sometimes confident about that too).
But all conduct is caused by, or counterfactually depends on, prior social
decisions of others; responsibility for wrongdoing is no exception.
With this in mind, consider:
Vision: As Seating Arrangement, except Teacher has a highly credible
and true vision of the future just prior to seating Billy and Bobby. She
knows exactly what will occur in their futures, and thus that who will
be responsible for wrongdoing depends on whom she sits next to Jack.
She also knows that immediately after seating the children, she will for-
get her vision, and so will be unable to influence their futures in the
light of what she knew. She must seat the two children in the two free
seats, or some much worse fate will befall them both.
Some may have skeptical worries about the possibility of gaining
knowledge about the future through visions. I propose to leave these
worries aside. The falsity of this has no bearing on my argument—if you
think that visions cannot provide decisive evidence, just fill in some other
mechanism that you find adequate—perhaps, for example, Teacher needs
a short spell of extraordinary powers of evidence gathering and reason-
ing.7 Or just imagine that Teacher has extremely powerful evidence about
the future from some other source.
6. David Lewis, for example, thought it obvious that there are no objective chances (other
than one or zero) in a deterministic world. See David Lewis, “Postscripts to ‘A Subjectivist’s
Guide to Objective Chance’,” in Philosophical Papers Volume II, ed. David Lewis (Oxford:
OUP, 1986), pp. 118–21. For a more developed analysis, see Jonathan Schaffer, “Deterministic
Chance?,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2007): 113.
7. Some think that there are in principle limitations on the ability of embedded systems in
a deterministic universe to predict future conduct. If there are, though, they arise because of
special cases where future systems are disposed to respond to the prediction itself. See, for
example, Stefan Rummens and Stefaan E. Cuypers, “Determinism and the Paradox of
Predictability,” Erkenntnis 72 (2010): 233. As Billy and Bobby have no reason to suspect that
Teacher has predicted the future, this issue is irrelevant to this case.
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As it is in Billy’s interests not to be seated next to Jack, Teacher has a
reason not to sit him there. Of course, she has an equally weighty reason
not to sit Bobby there, and it may seem that Teacher’s vision makes no
difference to what she should do. On the contrary, where there is a signifi-
cant good or a burden to be distributed, the good or burden must be dis-
tributed through a fair process. Where only one person can receive the
good or burden and other things are equal, we must ensure that each per-
son has an equal chance of receiving that good or burden, and that it is
not distributed for improper reasons.
This is no less true with respect to responsibility for wrongdoing. Given
their interests, Teacher should ensure that each has a fair chance not to
be seated next to Jack, and she should ensure that any bias that she has
toward Billy and Bobby does not influence her decision. She could do this
by flipping a coin. Coin-flips are not normally required where nothing is
at stake—were everything equal between the two seats, Teacher would
have no reason to flip a coin. This suggests that fairness determines what
Teacher should do.
The distributive significance of responsibility for wrongdoing is even
more powerfully illustrated by cases where further distributions of respon-
sibility for wrongdoing are available. Consider:
Vision (Three Options): As Vision except Teacher has a third option: to
sit Billy and Bobby next to each other. If she does this, each will com-
mit a less serious wrong against Jeff. This will make no difference to
Jeff, because suffering the two less serious wrongs is equally bad for
him overall as suffering one more serious wrong, committed by either
Billy or Bobby.
The intuition that Teacher ought to sit Billy and Bobby next to each
other is widely shared. Some might find it better to concentrate responsi-
bility for wrongdoing on either Billy or Bobby than to share it between
them, perhaps on the basis that it is especially important to keep one per-
son morally pure where this is possible. The more attractive view, and one
that is widely shared, is similar to that we find in other cases of distribu-
tive injustice. If a cost or burden of a certain fixed magnitude must be dis-
tributed between two people, and other things are equal, it should be
shared between the two, rather than being placed wholly on one person.
A wide range of moral views support this idea.
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This is just one of a wide range of parallels between our distributive
intuitions, theories, and judgments about responsibility for wrongdoing
and other things that are matters of justice. For example, familiar
dilemmas in distributive justice arise in the case of responsibility for
wrongdoing. And these dilemmas seem susceptible to just the same kind
of analysis as the distribution of other currencies. For instance, there is a
dilemma in distributive justice whether preventing a very trivial harm to a
large number of people can counterbalance preventing a very significant
harm to one person.8 A similar thing is true in the case of responsibility
for wrongdoing. Responsibility, on any sensible view, is scalar. Exactly
what makes it scalar is a difficult question that I set aside. Now suppose
that Teacher can either make it true either that Billy is highly responsible
for wronging Jeff, or that many people bear a tiny amount of responsibility
for wronging Jeff. If the overall magnitude of responsibility in the latter
case is greater than in the former case, ought Teacher to make it true that
Billy is highly responsible or that the second group each has a very small
amount of responsibility for doing that? This seems a difficult question,
and it is difficult in just the same way as the parallel case in harm distribu-
tion. I don’t mean to imply, here, that increases in one person’s responsi-
bility for some event necessarily reduces another’s – two people can be
fully responsible for the same event, so that there is a necessarily a fixed
amount of responsibility that needs allocating amongst people. I only
mean to point to the possibility of distributive dilemmas.
Or consider the dilemma whether to make one person very well off and
another very badly off, or to make two people moderately well off. Even if
aggregate welfare or resources is higher if the two are made unequally
well off, there is some pressure to make the two equally well off. The same
thing is true in the case of responsibility for wrongdoing. Suppose that two
people will act wrongly, but their degree of responsibility for their wrong-
doing will vary, say because the extent to which they are involuntarily
intoxicated is varied. Either one person will be fully responsible for the
wrongdoing and the other is not responsible at all, or both will be moder-
ately responsible for their wrongdoing. Even if the total magnitude of
responsibility is smaller if it is distributed unequally, there is some pres-
sure to make the two equally responsible.
8. The literature is vast, but perhaps the most comprehensive treatment is Larry Temkin,
Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: OUP, 2012).
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Difficult questions about the deeper grounds of principles that explain
egalitarian results in simple cases of welfare or resource distribution also
apply to responsibility to wrongdoing.9 For example, the intuition that
responsibility for wrongdoing should be shared equally in Vision 2 might
be defended on a deontic or a telic basis. The former view is that responsi-
bility for wrongdoing should be shared equally because that is the upshot
of the duties that Teacher owes to Billy and Bobby to give their interests
equal weight in her practical reasoning. The latter view is that an equal
distribution of responsibility for wrongdoing is more valuable (or less dis-
valuable) than an unequal distribution, and Teacher has good reason to
bring the most valuable distribution about. It might also be defended on
an egalitarian or prioritarian basis. The former view is an essentially com-
parative view: that equality of responsibility for wrongdoing is itself mor-
ally significant. The latter is not essentially comparative: the justice of an
equal distribution in simple cases is just the upshot of the fact that incre-
ments in responsibility for wrongdoing have greater moral significance
where a person is more responsible for wrongdoing than where a person
is less responsible for wrongdoing.
Though I cannot answer difficult questions about the right distributive
principles, or their grounds, here, there is at least some initial reason to
suppose that there are some general answers to these questions that apply
to welfare or resources on the one hand and responsibility for wrongdoing
on the other. A general project in distributive justice, then, is to consider
which questions apply equally to different justice relevant interests, and
which do not.
V. Responsibility, Opportunity, and Autonomy
Here I consider two objections to the view that responsibility for wrongdo-
ing is a matter of distributive justice.
A. Opportunity, Influence, and Actuality
First, it might be argued that the cases that I have outlined do not show
that responsibility for wrongdoing itself, but rather that the opportunity
9. Perhaps the most significant clarification of these disputes is Derek Parfit, “Equality
and Priority?,” in The Ideal of Equality, eds. M. Clayton and A. Williams (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 2002).
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not to be responsible for wrongdoing, is a matter of distributive justice. In
Seating Arrangement Billy’s opportunity not to act wrongly is worse than
Bobby’s in World 1, it might be argued, because of Jack’s bad influence.
Teacher’s decisions are just or unjust because of the distribution of that
opportunity, not the distribution of responsibility for wrongdoing itself.
One natural understanding of an opportunity is that opportunities are
shaped by the actual or expected results that one’s conduct can have, but
not by influences over one’s conduct. On that view, credible threats typi-
cally alter opportunities, because they add expected or actual costs to
one’s decisions. But pressure and persuasion need not—they may simply
alter the likelihood that one will act, but not the expected or actual results
of one’s actions without affecting the value of what is done. On that view,
assuming that people are able to do otherwise than they did, Billy and
Bobbly do not have importantly different opportunities.
Perhaps it might be argued that acting wrongly comes at a price for
Billy in World 1—he will seem less cool in Jack’s eyes, and that will erode
a friendship that he values. Let us, then, make this fact equal between
Billy and Bobby in each world:
Vision (Tone Variation): As Vision except John will also encourage who-
ever sits next to him to act wrongly, but that person will decide not to
do so. This will be so because Jack and John have different voice tones,
and due to their particular and relevantly similar genetic makeup, Billy
and Bobby each find Jack’s voice tone more persuasive. For that reason,
Billy assaults Jeff in World 1, where Bobby refrains from committing a
similar assault, and his friendship with Bobby is eroded. Things are
reversed between Billy and Bobby in World 2.
In Vision (Tone Variation) we have done a great deal to ensure that the
opportunities of Billy and Bobby are identical; it is the outcome of their hav-
ing these opportunities that differs. But the case is morally identical to Vision.
This is not to say that opportunities lack moral significance indepen-
dently of what people choose. There may be a range of reasons to value
unselected options. For example, the value of what we choose may
depend on whether we choose between valuable options, and we may
shape our own lives only if we decide between available options. But
whatever the selection-independent value of options, we also value, or
disvalue, responsibility for conduct as such, as we have seen.
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Perhaps the critic might then suggest that what matters for distribu-
tive justice is not just the distribution of opportunities, as I have
understood them, but the distribution of both opportunities and things
that might causally influence conduct.10 That would explain why
Vision (Tone Variation) is morally identical to (Vision). But there are
no reasons of justice to distribute things that might causally influence
conduct independent of their actually doing so, unless those things
have some further valuable property. And they need not. To see this,
suppose that in Vision (Tone Variation), whoever sits next to Jack will
find Jack’s voice more persuasive, but this person will nevertheless not
act wrongly because he will be deterred from doing so, and all else is
equal between Billy and Bobby. Now it hardly matters who sits next
to Jack.
Perhaps the critic might press on and claim that it is the distribution of
things that actually cause responsibility for wrongdoing that are the sub-
ject of distributive justice rather than responsibility for wrongdoing itself.
This view is extremely hard to believe. The causes of responsibility for
wrongdoing need have no moral significance at all independent of what
they cause. It is hard to see why the distribution of the causes could be a
nonderivative currency of justice. It is the distribution of responsibility for
wrongdoing itself that we care about.
B. Respect for Autonomy
A second objection is that respect for autonomy rules out responsibility
for wrongdoing a matter of distributive justice. One way to understand this
idea is that making decisions about responsibility for wrongdoing on the
basis of the interests of those who will be responsible is problematically
paternalistic.
While this may be true of some cases, though, it is not true in the
Vision cases. For example, Teacher’s decision not to seat anyone next to
Jack in Vision 2 is not objectionable on the grounds that this problemati-
cally interferes with the autonomy of the boys for their own sake. There
10. Some might think that things that influence, or tend to influence, us affect our oppor-
tunities, where others might think that they do not, but that distributive justice is concerned
with them, as well as with opportunities. This is just a terminological choice that makes no
substantive difference.
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are many reasons why. First, Teacher’s decision does not prevent the boys
from exercising their autonomy; rather it determines how they will exer-
cise their autonomy. And, at the moment the decision is taken, they are
young enough that paternalistic interference is unproblematic. Neither
Billy nor Bobby is controlled against their will for their sakes at a time
when they are autonomous agents.
Second, not all methods of shaping the lives of others for their own
sake involve the kind of interference that is problematically paternalistic.
At one end of the spectrum, one person can affect another’s decisions by
engaging with her autonomous agency—by giving advice or making legiti-
mate moral demands of others, for example. At the other, there is direct
manipulative interference through coercion, indoctrination, or neurologi-
cal interference. Keeping people away from bad influences is at the mild
end of the spectrum and is often unobjectionable. For example, restric-
tions on advertising of harmful tobacco products are designed to keep
people away from bad influences for their sake, but this does not seem
especially problematic.
Third, the extent to which shaping the life of another for their sake is
problematic depends on the particular aspect of their life. Autonomy is
not unconditionally valuable, or worthy of respect. There may be liberal
restrictions on influencing people to develop some beliefs, tastes, or
desires, or to value some things more than others. Within limits, it may
even be wrong to influence people not to value things that are valueless,
as some liberal neutralists believe. But there is no liberal objection to
preventing a person from acting in a seriously wrongful way, because it is
not valuable for a person to decide for herself to act in that way.11 I will
pick up this thread in Section VI.C, when we consider the relationship
between the distribution of responsibility for wrongdoing and the distribu-
tion of other things.
The scope of distributive justice for responsibility, then, is controversial,
where perfectionists and various different liberals will disagree about the
legitimate aims that people may have in shaping the lives of others by
shaping what they will be responsible for. But these disputes affect the
scope and implications of the idea that responsibility is a matter of distrib-
utive justice, rather than the truth of that idea.
11. See, further, Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes chap. 8.
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VI. Responsibility and Other Interests
Responsibility for wrongdoing is only one interest that makes social insti-
tutions or choices just or unjust. A complete account of the fair allocation
and distribution of things that matter depends on the place of responsibil-
ity for wrongdoing among other justice relevant interests.
A. Counterbalancing Responsibility
Some think that welfare is the, or a, currency of distributive justice; others
think it is opportunity for welfare; others capacities; and others resources.
Still others think that the appropriate way to distribute resources is not to
consider a metric for their distribution, but rather to engage in a hypothet-
ical bargaining process that is appropriately sensitive to people’s judg-
ments and choices. These disputes are largely about what we owe to
others with respect to, on the one hand, ensuring that they are well off,
and, on the other, respecting their autonomy.
We can side-step these disputes. Suppose that some resources can be
distributed between two people who will have equal capacities and oppor-
tunities to use any resources allocated to them. They have similar prefer-
ences and judgments, and they will use those resources to enhance their
welfare. And, suppose, the magnitude and quality of their opportunities,
as well as their actual welfare enhancement, is proportional to the magni-
tude of resources they are given. If other things are equal, on almost all
views, the resources ought to be distributed equally between the two. If
the resource available for allocation is indivisible, it ought to be allocated
by some fair mechanism, such as a coin-flip on almost all views. I thus
consider the interaction between the distribution of responsibility and the
distribution of welfare-generating resources that are equally valued.
Now let us see what difference it makes to our judgments about how
such resources should be distributed if we vary the distribution of respon-
sibility for wrongdoing but hold other things equal. That will help us
understand the way in which the distribution of responsibility for wrong-
doing interacts with other matters of distributive justice.
Consider:
Vision with Welfare: As Vision. However, after having her vision,
Teacher is provided with some indivisible resources, which she can
either place on the seat next to Jack or the seat next to John. Whoever
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sits on the seat with the resources on it will wrong Jeff. However, that
person will use his extra resources at some point in his life to promote
his welfare, and that the person will value this.
I have not specified the quality of the welfare that the person will gain.
We could imagine a range of cases. Many people think that welfare is
increased by (among other things) satisfaction at the exercise of virtues.
So, let us suppose that each has an appreciation for art, but one will have
greater resources and opportunities to visit galleries than the other, so that
his welfare is increased. Let us then say that Teacher has an “art ticket”
that she can place on either of the two seats. Should she place it on the
seat next to Jack, the seat next to John, or flip a coin?
I find it clear that Teacher should place the ticket on the seat next to
Jack, and a large majority of people that I have explored this issue with
agree (although a small minority demur). This judgment is not affected by
the fact that there may well be some determinism-compatible sense in
which the person who is seated next to Jack could have refrained from
acting wrongly. The fact that a person will act wrongly generates entitle-
ments, even where the person could, in some sense, have refrained from
acting wrongly.
Here is an explanation. Teacher, we have seen, ought to flip a coin to
determine who sits next to Jack, where each child has an interest in not
being seated there. We have seen that this interest is in not being
responsible for wrongdoing. Thus, whoever is seated next to Jack is
unlucky to be seated there. Teacher can counterbalance this bad luck by
providing the unlucky person with something he has an interest in—the
art ticket. In contrast, if Teacher places the art ticket on the seat next to
John, whoever is seated next to Jack will be doubly unlucky in having
two of his interests unsatisfied: his interest in not being responsible for
wrongdoing and his interest in the art ticket. It is fairer that the full
range of things that a person has an interest in are distributed more
evenly than less evenly, and therefore Teacher ought to place the ticket
on the seat next to Jack.
One way to characterize this view is that Teacher has a duty to counter-
balance the bad luck of it being inevitable that a particular person is
responsible for wrongdoing, if he is seated next to Jack, with the good luck
of his being provided with welfare-generating resources. Or, to put it more
controversially still, we ought to compensate people for being responsible
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for wrongdoing by providing them with more welfare-generating resources
than those who are not responsible for wrongdoing.
B. Intrapersonal Tradeoffs
Some might object that although responsibility for wrongdoing and
welfare are matters of distributive justice, they do not interact with
each other. Those with this view might think that Teacher ought to flip
a coin to determine who gets the art ticket in Vision with Welfare. This
view is hard to believe. Why are we not morally required to consider
all of the different interests that a person has in determining what we
do for her, rather than treating these different interests completely
independently?
This view that the different currencies of distributive justice interact is
supported by the fact that in ordinary life, we regularly make intrapersonal
tradeoffs between welfare-generating resources and responsibility for wrong-
doing. Consider upbringing. Suppose that you have a child. Depending on
how you bring her up, you will vary the amount of welfare-generating
resources and responsibility for wrongdoing in her life. If you spend all of
your time focusing on ensuring that she does not act wrongly, she will have
fewer welfare-generating resources and will be less happy as a result. If you
spend all of your time focusing on her welfare, she will act wrongly.
We commonly make decisions about how to bring up our children by
balancing these considerations. Suppose, for example, that a small decrease
in her responsibility for wrongdoing will result in her having far fewer
welfare-generating resources: you can get her never to lie, but this will make
her miserable throughout her life, where if she lies a little bit, she will be
very happy, due to the resources she is provided with. You should sacrifice a
bit of rightness for the sake of providing her with welfare-generating
resources. Or, to take the converse case, suppose that a small decrease in
her welfare-generating resources will result in her being far less responsible
for wrongdoing. You should sacrifice some resources for the sake of her not
being responsible for wrongdoing. This simple thought experiment shows
that when we decide what to do for the sake of a person, we make intraper-
sonal tradeoffs between welfare and responsibility for wrongdoing, and sim-
ple moral decisions about these tradeoffs are uncontroversial.
The fact that we make judgments about what to do for a person by
balancing their interests in not being responsible for wrongdoing with other
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interests helps to support the view that when we consider a person’s entitle-
ments, we ought to consider their overall set of interests together. And when
we compare their entitlements with those of other people, we compare their
overall sets of justice relevant interests with each other. We counterbalance
the failure to satisfy a person’s interests in welfare-generating resources by sat-
isfying her interests in not being responsible for wrongdoing and vice versa.
Normally, where there is a competition between the interests of two people,
and we disadvantage a person when compared with another with respect to
one kind of interest, we have reason to advantage her with respect to another.
C. Responsibility and Judgment
Another objection to the idea that people should be given welfare-
generating resources to counterbalance responsibility for wrongdoing
draws on the idea that we are not required to compensate people for
things they are responsible for, or that respond to their authentic judg-
ments, which is a familiar theme in recent debates on distributive justice.
Here is one version of the objection. Suppose that one person, A, has
tastes that are much more expensive to satisfy than another, B. It might be
argued that distributive justice does not require us to distribute resources
in a way that equalizes the welfare of A and B, other things equal. It is
unobjectionable that B is left better off than A where that difference is due
to A’s expensive tastes. The taste for wrongdoing, it might be argued, is
like an expensive taste, in that it inflicts costs on others.
This issue merits a longer discussion than I have space for here, but I
can at least sketch a response. First, the view that we should not compen-
sate people who have less welfare as a result of their expensive tastes is
itself a controversial view. To determine whether compensation is owed,
we should, among other things, consider whether the initial judgment that
such tastes should not be compensated can survive critical scrutiny in the
light of the kinds of deterministic challenges outlined in this article. Some
think that the question whether responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is
right depends on whether there is genuine responsibility.12 This article
suggests a different challenge—that even if there is genuine responsibility,
12. For anxiety about whether the significance of choice in distributive justice can survive
such scrutiny, see, for example, G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other
Essays in Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 32 and
119–20.
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a brightly illuminated understanding of what responsibility is, and its
social causes, gives it a quite different role in distributive justice than
responsibility-sensitive egalitarians suggest.
To make progress, responsibility-sensitive egalitarians might consider
versions of the Vision cases where different people have more or less
expensive tastes depending on where they were seated in childhood.
Investigating these cases is beyond the scope of this article, but it is by no
means obvious that the initial judgment that we should not compensate
people for expensive tastes will survive scrutiny in the light of such an
investigation.
Furthermore, at least some of the argument that has been given against
compensating people for expensive tastes does not apply to responsibility
for wrongdoing. Very roughly, there are two kinds of argument that might
be given. One is that people are not owed compensation because a liberal
society distributes resources without making judgments about the good
life, out of respect for its citizens. The second is that people are not owed
compensation for expensive tastes because if they are worse off, this will
be their own fault, or because they had an adequate opportunity to avoid
being worse off.
The first argument does not apply to responsibility for wrongdoing.
Consider Ronald Dworkin’s influential approach to the distribution of
resources.13 Dworkin argues that liberal societies are built on equal con-
cern and respect. Respect for citizens requires such societies not to distrib-
ute resources based on an evaluation of how well a person’s life goes
based on any particular conception of the good. Rather, the appropriate
way to determine what resources a person is entitled to is to consider
whether a person envies the bundle of resources that others have. In that
way, such a society has a fair mechanism for determining who gets what
whilst refraining from making judgments about the quality of a person’s
own life.
The person with expensive tastes need not envy the resources and
opportunities of those with less expensive tastes. She will not do so if she
values her expensive tastes over less expensive tastes. Even if she is left off
worse in welfare terms than the person with less expensive tastes, she will
not find the resources that she is provided with objectionable compared
13. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000); Ronald
Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2011), chap. 16.
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with the resources provided to others. Dworkin proposes a particular set
of mechanisms—a hypothetical auction coupled with a hypothetical insur-
ance scheme—to make this general idea concrete.14 The details of that
scheme need not detain us here.
This view does not support the view that people should not be com-
pensated responsibility for wrongdoing. Here are two replies that draw on
Dworkin’s ideas—one more limited and one more ambitious. The more
limited reply is that the distinction between facts that ground a claim for
resources and facts that do not depends on what people authentically
endorse about their lives according to their own values. Dworkin distin-
guishes between expensive tastes that reflect a person’s values and mere
cravings and disabilities that the person does not endorse.15
This can create the misleading impression that if a person is responsi-
ble for being worse off, she is not entitled to compensation. But what a
person is responsible for and what a person authentically endorses in the
light of what she values are not coextensive. A person can be responsible
for her conduct without endorsing or valuing it, and many people who are
responsible for what they do fail to value what they do. A person who
gives into temptation, and acts wrongly as a result, for example, does not
value acting wrongly, and respect for her does not militate against com-
pensating her for acting wrongly. Furthermore, a person may value acting
wrongly, but do so because she fails to draw proper conclusions from
what she values, due to temptation, manipulation, or social pressure.
Respect does not require us to withhold compensation where a person
fails to conclude that she is worse off for these reasons, but they need not
undermine responsibility.16
This reply, though, leaves open the possibility that a person would not
be entitled to compensation for responsibility for wrongdoing in cases
where she authentically values acting wrongly. But it is doubtful that
Dworkin’s view, as it is best understood, denies the right to compensation
even in these cases.
Consider the idea that in a liberal society, we defer to a person’s own
judgments about what is good for her out of respect for her as an
14. See, especially, Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chap. 2.
15. Ibid., pp. 287–96; Ronald Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies,” in Dworkin and His
Critics, ed. J. Burnley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 346–50.
16. See, also, Tom Parr, “How to Identify Disadvantage: Taking the Envy Test Seriously,”
Political Studies 66 (2018): 306.
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autonomous agent. If this is the foundation of a person’s claim to
resources, we should explore when respect requires us to defer to the
judgments of others. This will not provide a wholesale justification for
deferring to the views of citizens about what to value. And that makes a
difference to when compensation is owed.17
One obvious limit to the idea that we should respect a person’s judg-
ment with respect to how they live their own life concerns responsibility
for wrongdoing. Respect for a person does not require us to defer to her
judgment that serious wrongdoing is valuable for her. Think about the
idea that I might have reason to value having lived my own life
according to my own values. This is true when the what I value is valu-
able. Perhaps it is also true where what it is reasonable to value what I
value. But it is surely not true where what I value is wronging others.
Then, I have reason to disvalue having lived my life according to my
own values. That helps to vindicate the intuition that where I find out
that I have acted wrongly, I have reason to hope that I did not do so
autonomously. Thus, respect for agents in virtue of what they value does
not provide a reason to refrain from providing wrongdoers with com-
pensatory resources for acting wrongly, even where they value acting
wrongly.
To justify a policy of refraining from compensating those who are
responsible for wrongdoing, then, we cannot appeal to the idea that the
distribution of resources in a society is governed by respect for autono-
mous agents, and the different things they value in their own lives. It must
be justified by something like the second kind of argument: that a person
is not entitled to compensation if their being worse off is their own fault,
or if they had an adequate opportunity to avoid acting wrongly. And that
is precisely the kind of view that the Vision cases challenge. When we clar-
ify the social and natural causes of responsible conduct, we see fault as a
reason to transfer resources to the wrongdoer, not away from her. And the
fact that she had an opportunity to avoid doing what she did does not
undermine that judgment where what she did was inevitable given the
state of the world, and the laws that apply to it, before she was a responsi-
ble agent.
17. See, especially, Adam Slavny, “On Being Wronged and Being Wrong,” Philosophy, Poli-
tics & Economics 16 (2017): 3.
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D. Extra Options
Some may think that the reason why teacher ought to put the art ticket on
the seat next to Jack in Vision with Welfare is that the fates of Billy and
Bobby are codependent. Billy being placed next to Jack makes it the case
that Bobby will not be responsible for wrongdoing and vice versa. Lack of
responsibility for wrongdoing is like a scarce resource in this case in the
sense that the satisfaction of one person’s interest ensures that another
person’s interest is not satisfied. It might be argued that welfare-
generating resources ought not to be distributed to those who are respon-
sible for wrongdoing where this is not so—where one person’s responsi-
bility for wrongdoing does not depend on another’s. This, it might be
thought, limits the significance of Vision with Welfare in the real world,
where lack of responsibility for wrongdoing is not a scarce resource.
One response is that in the real world, lack of responsibility for wrong-
doing is often a scarce resource. Preventing responsibility for wrongdoing
takes investment in the kinds of programs that we considered in
Section II, but the investment needed for these programs is scarce, and
we must decide where to allocate these preventive resources.
More importantly, the proper allocation of welfare-generating resources
in Vision with Welfare is not best explained by the fact that the fates of
Billy and Bobby are codependent. Consider:
Assistant’s Vision with Welfare and Other Options: As Seating Arrange-
ment except Teacher has the option of sitting neither child next to
Jack—there are two empty seats either side of John, and if the children
are seated in these seats, neither will act wrongly later in life. However,
Assistant has a vision of the future. She knows that one person will be
seated next to Jack and the other will be seated next to John. Further-
more, the second person, whoever that is, would be seated next to John
even if the first were not seated next to Jack—there is another empty
seat next to John that the first would have taken. Assistant is provided
with some indivisible resources, which she can either place on the seat
next to Jack or the seat next to John.
Teacher makes the objectively wrong choice in seating a child next to
Jack—she should seat both children next to John. But the first child being
seated next to Jack does not prevent the second from being responsible
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for wrongdoing. Yet it is still powerfully intuitive that Assistant should
place the welfare on the seat next to Jack. Thus, welfare-generating
resources should be allocated to those who are responsible for wrongdo-
ing even where lack of responsibility for wrongdoing is not a scarce
resource. This is true whether Teacher is culpable for her choice to seat a
child next to Jack, because she has good reason to predict what will hap-
pen, or not.
And this case has a further important implication. Assistant has a pow-
erful reason to counterbalance responsibility for wrongdoing even though
Teacher’s conduct, not hers, results in a person being responsible for
wrongdoing. Thus, third parties should counterbalance responsibility for
wrongdoing that is caused by others with welfare-generating resources.
E. Time
Another response to Vision with Welfare is to accept that the art ticket
ought to be placed on the seat next to Jack, but to deny that this has impli-
cations for how a person should be treated later in life. Some might claim,
for example, that we have reason to advantage those who will inevitably
be responsible for wrongdoing prior their acting wrongly, but not after
they have acted wrongly.
There are two time-sensitive views. An agent-centered view is that we
are required to counterbalance responsibility for wrongdoing with
welfare-generating resources only where we can act prior to the person
being responsible for wrongdoing. A patient-centered view is that we are
required to counterbalance responsibility for wrongdoing only where the
allocation of resources, or the effects of those being allocated, will occur
before the person is responsible for wrongdoing.
Neither view is attractive. Focus on the agent-centered view first. Sup-
pose that I can provide a wrongdoer with more welfare-generating
resources after she has acted wrongly. On the agent-centered view, I am
required to do this if my act that causes her to acquire or use those
resources occurs prior to her wrongdoing, but I am required not to do it if
my act that causes her to acquire or use them occurs after her wrongdo-
ing. It is hard to see why this should make a difference.
Some might argue that many of our responses to wrongdoing are inher-
ently backward looking, and that this might support the agent-centered
view. For example, it is not apt for me to resent you, or to demand an
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apology and compensation, until you have wronged me, even where I
have powerful reasons to believe that you will wrong me. These reactions
to wrongdoing are irreducibly backward looking.
However, even if there is an important relationship between my reac-
tions and demands and my distributive decisions, the main reason why
these attitudes are backward looking is epistemic. The aptness of my hav-
ing the relevant attitudes and making the relevant demands depends on
my knowing about your wrongdoing, and I cannot normally know that
you will act wrongly.
I can sometimes know that you will act wrongly, but then it does seem
apt to have the relevant attitudes and make the relevant demands. For
example, suppose that you have a clear plan to wrong me, you are about
to wrong me, nothing stands in your way, and you have a strong track
record of following through. Might I not then know that you will wrong
me? I think I might. But if I do, it is apt to resent you for the wrong that
you will do. Suppose, for example, that you are in the course of beating
me to death. It seems apt to resent you for the fact that you will kill
me. And it seems apt to make demands of you in virtue of the fact that
you will—for example, the demand to help my family.
This demand might seem odd—it’s more important to demand that
you don’t kill me. But even if it is odd in this way, making the demand
that you respond to your wrongdoing is not inapt because it is made
too early. And it need not be odd—if I know that I cannot dissuade you
from acting wrongly, I might have good reason to demand that you
respond appropriately to your wrongdoing rather than demanding that
you desist. As the limits on the aptness forward-looking responses to
wrongdoing are primarily epistemic, we cannot rely on them to sup-
port the agent-centered view; if anything, they support the time-
neutral view that it does not matter when we make our distributive
decisions.
The patient-centered view fares no better. On that view, whether
Teacher should put the art ticket on the seat next to Jack or the seat next
to John depends on whether the ticket is valid prior to or after the wrong-
ful conduct. That is unintuitive in itself. Furthermore, the tradeoffs we
make between responsibility for wrongdoing and welfare-generating
resources in the case of upbringing are not time-sensitive. When deciding
the appropriate balance between welfare-generating resources and
responsibility for wrongdoing in upbringing, we do not consider the order
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in which these things will occur. It is hard to see why we should draw a
different conclusion in interpersonal cases.
Here is my conclusion. If I am right that if Billy is seated next to Jack,
Teacher ought to place the art ticket on the seat next to Jack, she ought to
give Billy the art ticket later in life in World 1, whether her act of giving, or
Billy’s receipt of the ticket, occurs prior to or after he wrongly assaults Jeff.
So now suppose that she is in World 1, sees Billy assault Jeff, and knows
that her decision to sit him next to Jack made it true that he assaults Jeff.
If she has an art ticket that she can give to either Billy or Bobby, distribu-
tive justice favors giving it to Billy other things equal. Furthermore, we can
conclude from this discussion, and our judgment about Assistants Vision
with Welfare and Other Options, that if third parties know that Teacher’s
decision has this effect, distributive justice also favors their giving it to
Billy other things equal.
Now reflect on the fact that all responsibility for wrongdoing is shaped
by social decisions such as those in the variations on Seating Arrangement
that we have been considering, and we have significant support for the
idea that distributive justice favors providing extra welfare-generating
resources to everyone who is responsible for wrongdoing in the real world.
And it is a short step to the view that distributive justice favors providing
fewer welfare-generating resources to everyone who is responsible for
good deeds in the real world.
VII. Natural and Social Causes
Some may reject the conclusion drawn in the previous section out of a
further concern. I have argued that distributive justice requires us to dis-
tribute welfare-generating resources to those who are responsible for
wrongdoing, and away from those who are not, where that wrongdoing
arises as a result of social decisions, other things equal. It seems that all
wrongdoing is attributable to social decisions, so this view seems to
require us to distribute welfare-generating resources to everyone who is
responsible for wrongdoing, and away from those who are not, other
things equal. However, it might be thought that things are different where
responsibility for wrongdoing arises through natural differences between
people, and they often do in the real world.
Those inclined to this view might draw comfort from the fact that some
think that inequalities more generally are unjust where they arise socially,
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but not naturally.18 Suppose, for example, there are no social differences
between the two seats in a variation on Vision with Welfare, but Billy and
Bobby act differently due to genetic differences between them. Then,
some might conclude, there is no reason to give Billy rather than Bobby
extra welfare-generating resources.
I doubt that the distinction between natural and social causes of
responsibility for wrongdoing is morally significant. Familiar and powerful
challenges to the significance of that divide extend to the just distribution
of responsibility for wrongdoing. One question concerns the best way of
drawing the social/natural distinction. In the real world, all responsibility
for wrongdoing arises due to some social facts. There are no purely natu-
ral sources of inequality between people with respect to responsibility for
wrongdoing. So, our question is whether there is a way of drawing the nat-
ural/social distinction in a way that is plausible, and that has implication
in our context. In the context of distributive justice more generally,
Thomas Nagel suggests that we do this as follows: where institutional
arrangements serve a purpose that is not to generate inequalities, and
inequalities arise due to natural differences, and achieving the purpose
without generating inequalities would be more difficult and costly, the
inequalities are natural, and are thus not unjust.19
But this view is not plausible.20 To see the problem clearly in our con-
text, compare Vision (Tone Variation) with a case where Jack and John
have identical voice tones, but Billy and Bobby are genetically different, so
that Billy is more likely to respond to their voice tone by doing what he is
told than Bobby (Small Genetic Variation). There does not seem to be any
important difference between Tone Variation and Small Genetic Variation.
And there are powerful reasons to ensure that responsibility for wrongdo-
ing is distributed equally between Billy and Bobby to eliminate the effects
of genetic differences between them because of their tendency to respond
to these different voice tones, even where doing this is costly.
18. See, especially, Thomas Nagel, “Justice and Nature,” in Concealment and Exposure
and Other Essays (Oxford: OUP, 2002). A variation on this view is that justice is only con-
cerned with inequalities that have an institutional cause. See Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institu-
tions, and Luck (Oxford: OUP, 2012).
19. Nagel, Concealment and Exposure and Other Essays, p. 125.
20. For a range of concerns in more familiar distributive contexts, see Tim Lewens, “What
Are ‘Natural Inequalities’?,” Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010): 264; Kasper Lippert-Rasmus-
sen, “Are Some Inequalities More Unequal than Others? Nature, Nurture and Equality,”
Utilitas 16 (2004): 193–219.
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Perhaps it might be argued that things are different in cases where one
person is naturally much more robustly disposed to be responsible for
wrongdoing than another. Suppose, for example, that Billy is genetically
disposed to be responsible for wrongdoing, so that he will act wrongly in a
much wider range of nearby possible worlds than Bobby, say because Billy
has higher levels of testosterone than Bobby (Large Genetic Variation).
It is hard to see why this makes a difference. Perhaps it might be
argued that there are stronger reasons for Billy to bear costs where these
costs arise as a result of features of him that stably incline him to act
wrongly. But it is hard to see why this is a reason to make him worse off
than others, who are caused to be responsible for wrongdoing in the
actual world, but whose tendency to act wrongly is less stable. Perhaps it
might be argued that this is true where larger genetic differences between
people also lead them to develop different characters, so that they endorse
their conduct. But this just brings us back to an issue we considered ear-
lier: whether respect for a person’s values makes a difference to what we
should do for them when they are morally worse off. I suggested that even
if it sometimes does, this has no bearing in the case of responsibility for
wrongdoing.
The same conclusions hold when we consider the implications of larger
social decisions that affect responsibility for wrongdoing. Suppose that
there are different ways to plan cities. One way of doing this (Plan 1) will
result in smaller inequalities in responsibility for wrongdoing, where the
other (Plan 2) will result in larger inequalities of this kind. However, Plan
2 is more costly, so everyone’s welfare-generating resources are slightly
reduced if Plan 2 is implemented. Whether Plan 2 should be implemented
does not depend on whether the resulting inequalities arise due to the
interaction of genetic facts and features of the plan, or whether they are
purely social. I conclude that distributive justice supports distributing
welfare-generating resources to everyone who is responsible for wrongdo-
ing, other things equal, regardless of the social or natural origins of their
responsibility for wrongdoing.
VIII. Why Distributive Justice Is not the Whole Story
I have argued that distributive justice requires distributing welfare-
generating resources to those who are responsible for wrongdoing, other
things equal, and away from those who are responsible for do-gooding. Of
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course, other things are often unequal. Distributing welfare-generating
resources to wrongdoers incentivizes wrongdoing, and that is a powerful
reason not to do this. And one reason is that incentivizing wrongdoing
gives rise to the very inequalities that we have been concerned with—by
attempting to correct the inequality between one person who is responsi-
ble for wrongdoing and another who is not, we may cause a third person
to act wrongly, who will then be a victim of the very kind of injustice that
we aimed to correct.
Furthermore, distributive justice is not the only consideration that
determines how resources ought to be allocated. It is part of the overall
set of factors that we take into consideration when deciding what to
do. A full assessment of the relationship between distributive justice
and other kinds of duties and permissions is beyond the scope of this
article, but I can at least illustrate the general idea that there are limits
to the significance of distributive justice for our duties with respect to
wrongdoers.
Here is one idea, though it is more limited than it at first seems. Justice
requires that we adequately respond to wrongdoing by vindicating the
rights of victims and condemning wrongdoing through public expression.
But, it might be argued, public expression would be adequate only if we
inflict costs on wrongdoers.21 And it would be undermined were we to
provide welfare-generating resources to wrongdoers.
Quite generally, I doubt that inflicting costs on wrongdoers is necessary
for the relevant forms of public expression.22 The aim of expressing con-
demnation of wrongdoing, and vindicating rights of victims, only seems
undermined if welfare-generating resources are provided to those who are
responsible for wrongdoing in certain ways. Just distributing cash to those
who are responsible for wrongdoing, for example, might be difficult to
achieve without creating the impression that the state is unconcerned with
the wrongdoing, or even values it.
21. This idea is familiar from expressivist theories of punishment. See, for example, Jean
Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” in Forgiveness and Mercy, eds. J. Murphy and J. Hampton
(Cambridge: CUP, 1988); Joshua Glasgow, “The Expressivist Theory of Punishment
Defended,” Law and Philosophy 34 (2015): 601; Bill Wringe, An Expressive Theory of Punish-
ment (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016).
22. See Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law
(Oxford: OUP, 2011), chap. 5.
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However, suppose that a state significantly increased funding of reha-
bilitative and social integration programs, and these were very effective
both in ensuring that wrongdoers recognized that their conduct was
wrong, and ensured that those responsible for serious wrongs engaged in
productive and rewarding work later in life. That proposal provides those
who are responsible for wrongdoing with more welfare-generating
resources but does not undermine the legitimate expressive or communi-
cative ambitions of the state. Still, there may be limits, in some social con-
ditions, to what can be done to promote distributive justice to those who
are responsible for wrongdoing, without undermining these ambitions.
Here is another idea. The permissibility of inflicting a cost on a person
for the sake of some goal depends on the duty that the person has to pur-
sue the goal at the relevant cost. This makes a difference to the costs that
can be inflicted on a person for the sake of assisting those they wrongly
harm. A person who acts wrongly may incur the relevant duty, and that
may make it permissible to inflict the cost on her, even where inflicting
this cost results in a distributive unfairness.
Consider, for example, whether Billy or Bobby owes Jeff assistance after
Billy assaults him in World 1 in Seating Arrangement. I have argued that
distributive fairness militates in favor of allocating resources to Billy rather
than Bobby. But that may not fully settle the question of who is required
to assist Jeff. Billy’s special connection to the harm that Jeff suffers
because he is responsible for it may give rise to a more stringent obliga-
tion on him to assist Jeff.23 His having this duty gives rise to a further dis-
tributive unfairness: he will both be responsible for wrongdoing, and, if he
does what he is required to do, he will be worse off than Billy with respect
to welfare. But it does not follow that Bobby has a more stringent duty to
assist Jeff than Billy. Distributive fairness and unfairness does not fully
determine our duties.
To see that this is so, consider the less controversial idea that people
have more stringent duties than strangers to help their family members.
The fact that my parent requires a great deal of assistance, where other
people’s parents do not, may result in my being worse off than others.
Some may believe that this gives rise to duties on others to compensate
23. For an argument that such duties survive in a deterministic world, see Tadros, Wrongs
and Crimes, chap. 5. Some prominent free-will skeptics accept this. See Derk Pereboom,
“Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Tadros’s Wrongs and
Crimes,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2019): 439.
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me to ensure distributive justice. I think that there are limits to this duty,
though, and sometimes my more stringent duty to my parents will leave
me worse off than others. Where this is so, others lack a duty to achieve
distributive justice all things considered.
The same is true of Billy and Bobby. Billy owes a stringent duty to assist
Jeff for having assaulted him. Fulfilling this duty will leave him worse off
than Bobby. Because this is distributively unfair, Bobby has some duty to
assist Billy. But this duty may be insufficiently stringent to achieve distrib-
utive fairness between them. In other words, two different considerations
pull in different directions. Billy’s special connection to the harm that Jeff
suffers militates in favor of his having a more stringent duty to assist Jeff,
even where that will leave him worse off. But distributive fairness militates
in favor of Bobby having a duty to bear costs to assist Jeff. This may result
in a situation which leaves Billy worse off than Bobby overall.
IX. Incompatibilism to the Rescue?
I have argued from compatibilist assumptions for a radical view in distrib-
utive justice—that distributive justice favors allocating welfare-generating
resources to those who are responsible for wrongdoing, and away from
those who are responsible for do-gooding. Although I softened the blow of
this radical conclusion somewhat in Section VIII, where I suggested that
distributive justice is not the whole story, many will find my conclusion
unpalatable. Where the conclusion is more counterintuitive than the pre-
mises, some might argue, the right response is to reject one of the pre-
mises. I will raise some doubts about this idea in Section X.
There is one important premise that I haven’t argued for: com-
patibilism. I just made some (fairly modest, it should be said) com-
patibilist assumptions in Section I. Although compatibilism is the most
popular view of responsibility, it has plenty of critics. Although I cannot
argue for compatibilism here, though, I can give reasons to think that my
argument, or a similar argument, will be compelling on any plausible
incompatibilist view.
Here’s why. Incompatibilists believe that responsibility is incompatible
with determinism. Now suppose that Determinism is false. Some
incompatibilists believe that the fact that it was not inevitable that I acted
in a certain way in the actual world might make me responsible for my
conduct. However, any plausible version of this view must make room for
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the fact that people’s conduct is subject to social influences, and these
influences increase or decrease the probability of wrongful or do-gooding
conduct. To be plausible, incompatibilism must be able to explain, for
example, why advice and incentives increase the probability of people act-
ing one way or another without undermining her responsibility for her
conduct. For surely a person can be responsible for what she does even
though she acts as a result of advice and incentives that increase the prob-
ability of the conduct she is advised or incentivized to perform.
But social facts alter the probability of all of our conduct. People then
have an interest in the existence of social facts that decrease the probabil-
ity of their acting wrongly and increase the probability of do-gooding. This
has distributive implications that are similar to those explored earlier. For
example, suppose that in a variation on Vision (Three Options), Teacher
knows that a child that sits next to Jack has the highest probability of
being responsible for wrongdoing, a child that sits next to John has the
lowest probability of being responsible for wrongdoing, and a child that
sits next to Billy or Bobby has an intermediate probability of being respon-
sible for wrongdoing. Distributive justice favors the third option of sitting
Billy and Bobby together.
It might be argued that this view does not establish that responsibility
for wrongdoing is part of the currency of distributive justice; only that facts
that affect the probability of responsibility for wrongdoing are part of the
currency of distributive justice. But although justice requires the fair distri-
bution of the probability of responsibility for wrongdoing, that element of
justice is completely dependent on the significance of responsibility for
wrongdoing. And the outcome with respect to responsibility for wrongdo-
ing ultimately determines how future decisions about welfare-generating
resources should be made.
Suppose that Teacher sits Billy next to Jack. This is against Billy’s inter-
ests, because it increases the objective probability that he will be responsi-
ble for wrongdoing. If Teacher has an art ticket, she ought to give that
ticket to Billy, some might think. That is true where Teacher does not
know the outcome of her decision. Then, by allocating the ticket to Billy,
she increases the probability that it will go to the person who is responsi-
ble for wrongdoing. But now suppose that the ticket is to be allocated after
the time where he might act wrongly, but he does not. Now Teacher lacks
a reason to allocate the art ticket to Billy. Why? Because his interest in not
having his chance of being responsible for wrongly increased is completely
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derived from his interest in not being responsible for wrongdoing. Where
the increased chance of his acting in this way does not actually result in
responsibility for wrongdoing, there is no reason to counterbalance the
unfair distribution of chances by providing him with welfare-generating
resources.
Furthermore, suppose that although Billy has a greater chance of being
responsible for wrongdoing than Bobby because of where they are seated,
Bobby acted wrongly. Then distributive justice militates in favor or provid-
ing welfare-generating resources to Bobby. Although the unequal distribu-
tion of chances favored him ex ante, this did not in fact benefit him. The
result of the actual role of the dice determines what we should do, even
where the dice are weighted.
To reinforce this view, compare the relationship between risks and out-
comes in other distributive contexts. Suppose that I have an indeterminis-
tic machine that will allocate welfare to Billy and Bobby. The machine has
only one button, which gives Billy a 75% chance of receiving a benefit and
Bobby a 25% chance of receiving a benefit. If I have a further welfare-
generating resource that must be allocated prior to pressing, I ought to
give it to Billy. Now suppose that I can only allocate the resource after
pressing. I press the button, and the machine gives the benefit to Bobby. I
now have reason to benefit Billy, and no significant reason to benefit
Bobby; the fact that Billy was better off with respect to the chance of
receiving a benefit seems to make little or no difference when deciding
how to act in the future.
A similar thing is true with respect to responsibility for wrongdoing. Sup-
pose, for example, that Billy and Bobby are each torn, where that the physi-
cal feature that makes it true that they act wrongly, or not, is an
indeterministic mechanism in their brains. But the mechanism gives Billy a
25% chance of acting wrongly where Bobby has a 75% chance of acting
wrongly. However, the mechanism results in Billy acting wrongly where
Bobby does not. I should allocate welfare-generating resources on the basis
of the outcome, not the probabilities, if possible. In an indeterministic world,
we have reason to distribute resources or welfare to those who subject to
the social or natural conditions that make them more likely to be responsi-
ble for wrongdoing ex ante. But we only have reason to distribute resources
or welfare to those who are actually responsible for wrongdoing ex post.
This, of course, is only a sketch of an argument. But it at least suggests
that the strongly counterintuitive view that distributive justice requires us
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to distribute welfare-generating resources to those who are responsible for
wrongdoing is true if standard folk judgments about responsibility are
true, regardless of whether they are best explained by compatibilist or
incompatibilist theories of responsibility.
X. Conclusion
Some may still be unmoved. The idea that distributive justice favors pro-
viding welfare-generating resources to wrongdoers, and away from do-
gooders, is, I have acknowledged, very strongly counterintuitive. Some
might think that even if I have provided significant support for the pre-
mises of my argument, rejecting them is less counterintuitive than
accepting the conclusion.
Here is a response. When considering the extent to which an intuition
supports a view, we should consider both its strength and its reliability.
This is familiar from the analysis of manipulation cases in debates about
responsibility. A powerful strategy for compatibilism skeptics is to begin
with cases where a person is manipulated by evil scientists to act wrongly,
but fulfills all plausible compatibilist conditions of responsibility. The
skeptic then aims to show that there is no responsibility-relevant differ-
ence between manipulation cases and everyday cases where a person’s
conduct is fully determined without manipulation.24 A familiar response is
that this test can be run backward—start with cases not involving manipu-
lation where it is strongly intuitive that we are responsible, show there is
no difference between these cases and manipulation cases, and draw the
conclusion that we are responsible in manipulation cases.25
This seems to create a standoff between skeptics and compatibilists.
But at this point each can make claims about the strength and the reliabil-
ity of intuitions about these cases. On the one hand, following Benedict de
Spinoza, skeptics point out that we have unreliable intuitions about free
will that result from the fact that, from the internal point of view, our con-
duct does not seem fully determined, and the causes of our conduct are
not fully present in our decisions.26 On the other hand, compatibilists
point out that we have unreliable intuitions about manipulation cases,
24. The best argument of this kind that I know of is Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and
Meaning in Life, chap. 4.
25. See, especially, McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument.”
26. See, especially, Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, pp. 92–93.
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because they create the impression of a contrast between the fully respon-
sible manipulators, and the person manipulated.27 Thus it is difficult to
know who wins.
There is no similar standoff with respect to our cases. Although the
intuition that justice does not require giving welfare-generating resources
to wrongdoers is powerful, it is also unreliable for Spinozist reasons, and
perhaps for other reasons—some might think, for example, that our
retributivist sentiments are vulnerable to evolutionary debunking argu-
ments. But there is less reason to doubt the reliability of our intuitions
about the Seating Arrangement cases. The compatibilist response to
manipulation cases is not available to challenge those intuitions, and it is
not easy to see what other doubt we should have. Perhaps it might be
argued that we generally find it hard to hold in our head both the idea
that a person’s conduct is determined by a background choice, such as
Teacher’s, and the (compatibilist friendly) voluntary choice that the per-
son makes. I doubt that this is especially difficult—it is a common feature
of everyday life that our actions can be shaped by external factors, such as
persuasion and advice, and yet chosen.
Even if my conclusion is more strongly counterintuitive than some of
the judgments about cases that I rejected in my arguments, intuitions that
conflict with the conclusion are less reliable. Overall, I am more confident
in the radical conclusion than I am in the view, for example, that the art
ticket should be placed on the seat next to John in Vision with Welfare.
We may be responsible for wrongdoing, but that is a reason to make us
better off.
27. See Sartorio, Causation and Free Will, pp. 156–70; Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes,
pp. 76–77.
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